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Abstract. One of the big challenges in program obfuscation consists in
modifying not only the program’s straight-line code (SLC) but also the
program’s control flow graph (CFG). Indeed, if only SLC is modified, the
program’s CFG can be extracted and analyzed. Usually, the CFG leaks
a considerable amount of information on the program’s structure.
In this work we propose a method allowing to re-write a code P into
a functionally equivalent code P ′ such that CFG(P ) and CFG(P ′) are
radically different.
1 Introduction
In the white-box security model, adversaries have access to a program’s internals
— assembly code, memory, etc. This model captures real-world attacks against
low-end devices, as well as software disassembly and dynamic analysis. Such
attacks may allow the adversary to extract secrets from the implementation,
either in the form of tokens (passwords, etc.), intellectual property (algorithms,
etc.), or may help uncover design flaws that may later be exploited. Reverse-
engineering may also help the adversary recognize some trait that the program
shares with other programs, e.g. in the case of malware analysis or intellectual
property infringement. The general aim of obfuscation is to prevent reverse-
engineering, by defeating automated methods and stave off human efforts to
make sense of the code. Applications of RE-evasion techniques are many, and
constitute for instance an essential building block of digital rights management
(DRM) systems.
Historically, program identification focused on finding known code chunks
called signatures in the binary. While this technique is still widely in use amongst
intrusion and virus detection systems, such an approach requires both extensive,
and up-to-date, databases (to account for the ever-growing corpus of threats) and
a very efficient binary comparison method. At the same time, widely used pack-
agers with self-modifying code capacity, now standard amongst virus designers,
made the traditional signature-based approach less and less effective.
Indeed, an increasing number of malicious programs re-write their executable
code so as not to feature any recognizable code of significant length. In prac-
tice, it is not even necessary to resort to very complex re-writing mechanisms:
the malicious code can simply add (or remove) useless instructions or instruc-
tion sequences (such as nop, and reversible register operations, e.g. inc/dec) to
thwart a trivial comparison. While such variations can be accounted for, they
require significantly more effort from the analyst, especially when scanning a
large number of files.
An alternative, and certainly complementary approach to malware detection
and analysis consists in running the program under certain controlled environ-
ment, or sandbox, in which every operation can be monitored and does not impact
the “real” underlying system. Sandboxes typically implement a form of virtu-
alized environment, and monitor access to resources, secrets, and peripherals
to detect abnormal behavior. Naturally, the term “abnormal” is application-
dependent, hence this approach assumes that characteristic behavioral features
are known and are sufficiently distinguishable from those of uninfected software.
Furthermore, running such a controlled environment is resource- and time- de-
manding. This limits the interest of sandboxing as a program identification tool.
Between these two approaches, recent research focused on methods for com-
paring programs using control-flow graph isomorphism [4,6,7]. The rationale is
that the program’s flow graph (CFG) wouldn’t be altered significantly by the
adjunction or removal of useless “decoy” operations, the kind of which thwarts
direct comparison. CFG comparison techniques are also unaffected by straight-
line code obfuscation techniques, e.g. when each function’s code is completely
rewritten. CFGs can be extracted statically to a large extent, and therefore con-
stitute an attractive and resource-frugal alternative to full-blown virtualisation.
Defeating CFG analysis. In the malware-writing community, a typical anti-
reverse engineering technique is the trampoline: instead of using typical control
flow instructions such as jmp or call, the program makes heavy use of exception
handling, that preempts the instruction pointer and runs the exception handler,
which re-dispatches control flow to another program part (see e.g. [3]). After
execution, each program part raises an exception, and falls back to an excep-
tion handler (hence the name, trampoline). There can be several trampolines,
which may be created and moved at runtime, and code boundaries need not be
rigid. This prevents disassemblers from reliably cross-referencing information,
and makes it difficult to perform dynamic analysis as well, because it is typically
impossible to run such code within a debugger.
However, because there is no classical call hierarchy, trampolines have to
emulate the stack, and an analyst that recognizes the mechanism can easily
reconstruct the control flow graph by following this pseudo-stack. Therefore,
while the use of trampolines slows down analysis, it is by no means an efficient
method anymore against trained reverse engineers, and the additional effort put
into designing such code is not worth the marginal gain.
Recent work tried to automate the process, which strives to achieve a “flat”
control flow graph, i.e. a graph with either a single central trampoline that
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dispatches execution, or a program that is fully unrolled and appears as a long
straight-line code segment without internal structure [1,2,8,10,11,14,16]. However
not only are such techniques not always applicable, but more importantly they
tend to produce code that, while “flat”, has salient signatures.
Our contribution. This paper addresses the question of rewriting a program in
a way that hides its original control flow graph from static analysis (and, to a
certain extent, from dynamic analysis as well), while preserving functionality.
Straight-line code (SLC) obfuscation techniques can be used on top of our con-
struction to destroy remaining signatures. Indeed SLC obfuscators have already
been described in the literature and shown to effectively defeat classic code anal-
ysis techniques [15]. The rewriting is randomized, and produces different outputs
every time. Unlike the trampoline construction, whose heavy use of exception
handling is easily recognizable, and from there, traceable, our construction only
uses common instructions and relies on a specific routing mechanism along exe-
cution — which is much harder to detect.
More formally, given a program P , we show how to obtain a functionally
equivalent program P ′, such that the CFG of P ′ is essentially a random graph.
This transformation is automatic, and we show how to implement a CFG-
transcompiler for the x86-64 architecture, which is widely used and furthermore
makes our implementation easier.
2 Control Flow Graph Transcompilation
2.1 Prerequisites
The control flow graph of a program is a graphical representation, based on
nodes and edges, of the paths that might be traversed by the program during
its execution.
Definition 1 (Control Flow Graph). The (full) control flow graph of a pro-
gram P is the graph whose nodes are the program’s instructions and the edges
are control flow transitions. The restricted control flow graph of P has for nodes
straight-line blocks, i.e. a maximal sequence of code without departure or arrival
of static jumps, and there is an edge from node x to node y (and we write x→ y)
if either of the following conditions hold:
– The code of node y is located immediately after the node x, and both are
separated by a conditional jump.
– The last instruction of the node x is either a conditional or a static jump,
which is a call to the physical address of the beginning of the node y.
In the following, unless specified otherwise, we always refer to the restricted con-
trol flow graph. This construction does not include information about dynamic
jumps: In practice it is challenging to statically and reliably resolve dynamic
jumps. The ret instruction, which we cannot ignore since it is often used to
implement function calls, will be dealt with in a special way.
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However, other dynamic and indirect control flow modifications (e.g. by direct
alteration of the instruction pointer, or non-standard exception handling) are
not considered in this work. On the one hand this is a limitation that may
prevent some programs from undergoing the transformation that we propose.
On the other hand, this may constitute an interesting countermeasure against
code-reuse and hijack attacks that leverage such possibilities.
Let P be the program to be obfuscated. We denote by G = (V,E) the CFG
of P , where V and E correspond respectively to the nodes and edges of G. Let
G′ = (V ′, E′) be a given “final” target CFG.
Example 1. Consider the following program, implementing a simple double-and-
add algorithm:
dbl_add (int , int ): ; Compute ab from integer arguments a and b
test esi , esi
mov eax , 0 ; tmp = 0
jle .end ; if b == 0, return tmp
.loop:
lea edx , [rax +rax] ; tmp2 = 2 tmp
add eax , edi ; tmp = tmp + a
test sil , 1
cmovne eax , edx ; if b even set tmp = tmp2
sar esi ; shift b to the right
jne .loop ; loop if b > 0
rep ret
.end:
rep ret
The CFG associated to this program is represented in Figure 1, where the in-
structions’ arguments have been removed for clarity. The associated restricted
CFG is represented in Figure 2.
test mov jle lea add test cmovne sar jne rep ret
Fig. 1: Full CFG of the program of Example 1.
test + mov jle lea add · · · sar jne rep ret
Fig. 2: Restricted CFG of the program of Example 1.
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2.2 Overview of our Approach
Our goal is to rewrite P into a program P ′ that achieves the same functionality
as P , but whose CFG is G′ 6≃ G = (V,E) = CFG(P ). This is achieved in
successive steps, illustrated in Figures 3 to 6.
Step 1: Relabeling. We start from a morphism pi between the two graphs, i.e. a
function that is injective on nodes and preserves edges. If we fail to find enough
nodes or edges to perform this operation, which happens with very low proba-
bility when the target graph is large enough, we simply start over with a new
random graph G′. The process is illustrated in Figure 3.
CFG(P ) G′
pi
−−−−→
Fig. 3: Illustration of Step 1: Relabeling. The original nodes and edges from
CFG(P ) are assigned different colors, other nodes are in gray.
Step 2: Breaking Edges. Then, additional nodes will be added by transforming
the graph. The idea is to replace simple edges by paths in G′ = (V ′, E′), i.e.
for each edge (a, b) ∈ E, corresponding to an edge (pi(a), pi(b)) ∈ E′, we replace
(pi(a), pi(b)) by a path (pi(a), f((a, b)), pi(b)), where f is a prescribed function.
Such a function f : E → List(V ′) must return paths already present in G′, i.e.
assuming that f((a, b)) = (s1, . . . , sn),
– (pi(a), s1) ∈ E
′
– (sn, pi(b)) ∈ E
′
– ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, (si, si+1) ∈ E
′
We keep track of which edges were originally present and which edges were added
at this step. The process is illustrated in Figure 4.
Step 3: Identify Active and Passive Nodes. The previous step introduced “extra”
operations between a and b. Since we wish to preserve the original program’s
functionality, we should make sure that only the original endpoints, a and b, are
executed, while all the intermediary nodes are without effect when executed. We
call a and b the active nodes, and the intermediary nodes (i.e. nodes that do not
exist in the original CFG) are called passive.
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a b
Step 1
−−−−→
pi(a) pi(b)
Step 2
−−−−→
pi(a) pi(b)
· · ·
s1 s2 sn
Fig. 4: Illustration of Step 2: Breaking edges. The original path pi(a) → pi(b) is
extended by a path f((a, b)) = (s1, . . . , sn) of G
′.
Remark 1. A node that is neither active nor passive in the control flow graph G
can be considered either active or passive in G′.
Depending on the execution path taken, some nodes may be active or passive
(e.g. Figure 5). To decide whether a given node is active or passive, the program
(more precisely, the node itself) checks at runtime the value of a routing variable
(see below).
pi(a)
pi(b)
pi(c)
pi(d)
Step 3
−−−−→
pi(a)
pi(b)
pi(c)
pi(d)
Fig. 5: Illustration of Step 3: Identifying active and passive nodes. Here two
original sequences pi(a)→ pi(b) and pi(c)→ pi(d) cause some nodes to be passive
(empty circle), active (filled black circle), or active depending on the execution
path taken (grey circle).
Step 4: Routing. Finally, we transform each node so that the execution of passive
nodes is without side effects (a process we call passivation), except continuing
through the sequence of nodes until an active node is attained. To that end we
introduce an additional “routing” variable that will be updated as the program
is executed (e.g. Figure 6).
Nodes consult the routing variable to know whether they are active or not;
if not, they simply hand over execution to the next node in sequence (possibly
after executing dummy instructions).
2.3 Contexts
During program execution, every node in the transformed program undergoes
the following procedure:
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m = 0
s1
pi(a)
m = 1
s2
m = 0
s3
m = 0
pi(b)
m = 1
pi(c)
m = 1
s4
m = 0
Fig. 6: Illustration of Step 4: The path is taken according the routing variable
m. If the node is passive (m = 0), the path to be taken will be the subsequent
node. In the case of a active node (m = 1), the next node will be defined by the
current node
1. Determine whether node is active or passive.
2. If active, restore the registers. Otherwise passivate itself.
3. Run the code.
4. Call the next node in the sequence.
To allow this series of operations, we introduce the concept of contexts.
A context is a set of variables that save the node’s state, in a way that
can later be restored. Each traversed node is associated to a context, which is
available just during the time that the node is being traversed.
Since passive nodes do not suffer side effects, they cannot in particular find
the next node to be called; hence the next node is part of the context. If the
node is active, it may ignore this part of the context and branch itself to another
destination.
2.4 Node Passivation
Node passivation requires us to cancel the instruction(s) being executed, or com-
pensate their effects in some way. We do this by using both the registers and the
stack (it is not possible to rewrite registers that are in active mode), leveraging
the specificities of the x86-64 architecture.
Register operations. Any register operation can be dealt with by using contexts,
with the exception of the stack registers.
Stack operations. Stack operations are harder to compensate: the following in-
structions have an effect on the stack
PUSH, POP, PUSHA, POPA, PUSHAD, POPAD, PUSHF, POPF, PUSHFD, POPFD
We control writing and reading in the stack by using a pointer to a “trash”
address, stored as a fixed value. If a passive node attempts to write something
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in the stack, we redirect the address to the trash, nullifying the instruction’s
effects. The reading process is handled in the same way. If the node is active,
the real address is used.
The context m is used in the following way: after a PUSH, we perform the
following operation to the pointer to the top of the stack p:
p← p+ (8 & m)
where
– m = 1 · · · 12 if the node is passive. In this case the operation will be compen-
sated and will not have any effect due to the top of the stack not changing.
– m = 0 if the node is active. In this case the addition is useless and the PUSH
works as intended.
MOV instruction. mov instructions from one register to another are already with-
out effect, since register values are restored at the beginning of each active node,
and are stored in the environment. However, mov instructions that involve a
memory address require additional care, and we use the same technique as for
the stack: the address is rewritten to the “bin” when the node is passive. This
is followed by the transformation:
address = (address & (¬m))|(trash_address & m)
This technique also hides the addresses that are really used during program
execution.
Function calls. We will distinguish library function calls and calls to internal
functions, that are defined in the code.
Library calls. In the case of library function calls, each of them is treated sep-
arately by using a specific context per function. Now, considering that it is
impossible to handle all the functions at the same time, we propose to call the
functions by using parameters that make them ineffective.
Example 2. In the following "Hello World" program, where we make ineffective
the function printf by loading to EAX the address of an empty sentence (auxiliary
parameter) and set the stack pointer to the address of EAX.
extern _printf
global _main
section .data
param1: db "Hello World" ,10,0
paramaux : db "" ,0 ; declaration of the empty sentence
section .text
_main:
push param1
lea eax , [paramaux ] ; paramaux address placed in EAX
mov [esp], eax ; pointer to the empty sentence
call _printf
add esp ,4
ret
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2.5 Jumps and Internal Calls
Internal calls. Recall that we distinguish between a call to an address in a PUSH
from a static jump. This makes the above transformation effective to handle
these instructions. However, the RET instruction corresponds to a dynamic jump
and is subtler to handle.
Let n be a node with a RET instruction in G, and assume that in G′ the
corresponding node pi(n) has two neighbors, f1 and f2. Their addresses are fixed,
so that one can place, on the top of the stack, the address of the node that follows
pi(n) (either f1 or f2).
Example 3. In the following example, we print on the screen the result returned
by func1. In this case, we jump from func1 to func2 adding the desired address
on the top of the stack by using a push operation. As a result, the program
jumps to func2 instead of jumping back to the address after the call.
extern _printf
global _main
section .data
num DD 2,3
format: dd "num : %d" , 10, 0
section .text
_main:
mov eax ,0 ; eax = 0
mov esi , [num] ; edi = 2
mov edi , [num +4] ; esi = 3
push esi ; pass param 3 to .func1
push edi ; pass param 2 to .func1
push eax ; pass param 1 to .func1
call .func1 ; jump to func1
add esp ,12 ; pop edi , esi and eax from the stack
push eax
push dword format
call _printf ; print eax in the screen
add esp ,8 ; pop stack 2*4- byte
.func1:
push ebp
mov ebp ,esp ; set stack base pointer
sub esp , 4 ; creat space for one 4-byte local variable
push edi ; Save the values of the register that the function will use
push esi
mov eax ,[ebp +8] ; move param 1 to EAX
mov edi ,[ebp +12] ; move param 2 to EDI
mov esi ,[ebp +16] ; move param 3 to ESI
mov [ebp -4],edi ; var local = 2
add [ebp -4],esi ; var local = 5
mov eax , [ebp -4] ; EAX = 5
pop esi ; remove esi from the stack
pop edi ; remove edi from the stack
mov esp ,ebp
pop ebp ; takedown stack base pointer
lea ecx ,[ .func2]
push ecx ; push func2 address on the top of the stack
ret ; jump func2
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.func2:
push ebp
mov ebp ,esp ; set stack base pointer
sub esp , 4 ; creat space for one 4-byte local variable
push edi ; Save the values of the register that the function will use
mov edi ,[num] ; edi = 2
mov [ebp -4],eax ; var local = 5
add [ebp -4], edi ; var local = 7
mov eax ,[ebp -4] ; EAX = 7
pop edi ; remove edi from the stack
mov esp ,ebp
pop ebp ; takedown stack base pointer
ret
2.6 Routing
Once we have passed through a passive node, without changing the environment,
we must be capable to take the next desired branch. As each node is a maximum
of two out-degree, all that we need is a boolean variable in the environment that
will indicate to which child we must to go.
In practice, it is enough to maintain a global routing variable r. This allows
the sequence of branches to follow (left or right) between two consecutive nodes.
Hence, we modify r for each active node found and its i-th bit gives the direction
of the i-th branch of the current path. We will denote by ri the i-th bit of r.
Remark 2. Routing variables have a limited size if we use native types, it is
straightforward to extend them but additional arithmetic is needed.
JUMP instruction. First of all, we need to transform a conditional jmp from P into
a jmp that goes to the next node as determined by ri. For simplicity, we assume
that all conditional jumps test a “zero flag”, which is set by a comparison just
before the jump. For example, we have the node A (with children B and C) and
the following program:
cmp (... ) ; comparison
je B ; conditional jump to B
C ; next node
As we know how to move from node A to node B or C in advance, we can save
the routes in some constants A_to_B and A_to_C. For doing so we use the
following code:
mov routing_variable , A_to_C ; set routing variable
cmp (... ) ; comparison
cmove routing_variable , A_to_B ; set routing variable iif comparison succeeds
This program then jumps according to the first value of the routing variable.
Note that, for passive nodes, routing variables are set to the (masked) trash
address.
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RET instruction. When a node is passive, we want to have two possible branches
as in the case of the jump instruction. To achieve this we also store the constants
A_to_B and A_to_C; and we will use the mask m as the context. We will go
to node B if ri = 1 and to node C if ri = 0.
We want to put at the top of the stack the address to which we want to go.
Hence, we just add the following line before the ret:
p← (p & m)|((r & A_to_B)|(¬r & A_to_C)) & ¬m
The transformation presented above allows us to modify the program’s control
flow graph. We are capable of transforming an arch into a path, and ensuring
that the path’s execution is identical to the effect of running the arch in the
original graph.
3 Control Flow Graph Obfuscation
While the presented construction effectively transforms the program’s CFG, the
resulting construction has a strong signature, and it is easy to reverse the process
to obtain the initial graph. It is indeed enough to run the program and identify
nodes that change the routing variable. These nodes are the active ones, and it
is possible to reconstruct the original control flow graph.
In this section we propose several ways to obfuscate the transformed program
and make this reconstruction harder. First, we will “force” the execution of the
program in order to recover successfully the initial control flow graph, we then
hide the nodes’ activity, including the operations on the routing variable, which
is a signature of an active node.
3.1 Forcing Execution
For now, we know that the routing variable suffices to determine the next active
node. We will modify its definition and use it to hide the control flow from
static analysis. The routing variable is now maintained as a sequence of bits
(r1, . . . , rn).
Upon transitioning to node i, we apply to the routing bit ri a random per-
mutation fi of {0, 1}.
Example 4. For example, if one seeks to obtain at the end of the function a bit
equal to 1, the following operations can be used:
r ← 0 Null routing variable
a← rand() Introduce randomness
t← 5a
t← t+ r × a
r′ ← t/a mod 2
At the end of the code execution we obtain r′ = 1. If we declare r = 1 instead,
we get r′ = 0.
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We can easily generate the random flips fi by using an arithmetic operation and
its inverses. As determining the value of a variable is undecidable, running the
program is the most natural way to get information about the execution paths
taken.
3.2 Node Hiding
The same way that routing bits are masked, we can hide the value of the bit
indicating whether a node is active or passive. However by doing so node i only
hides the status of node i+1. The mask’s value can also be changed by choosing
a random number between m and ¬m, and updating the formula accordingly.
3.3 Route Hiding
Updates of the routing variable are crucial, as they immediately reveal active
nodes. To hide the information about the routing changes, we extend each path
beyond the active node, and introduce a weak form of “onion” routing, where the
next node is determined at runtime. The rationale is that determining whether
a node is active or inactive will require recovering the full route leading to this
particular node.
We introduce two additional variables per node, called path and next path.
The next path variable is masked (XORed) with a value that depends on the
node. Upon execution of an active node, the values of these two new variables
are further modified.
If the next node is C, the route from B to C is stored in next path, and
masked by being XORed with the constants of every intermediary node between
A and B.
The number of hops is counted. Upon arriving at the final hop B of the path
from A to B, we swap next path and path.
The route hiding process is illustrated in Figure 7.
4 Security
Intuitively, the security of our construction depends on the hardness of identi-
fying active nodes. This can be formalized as an adversarial game, whereby a
more precise security notion can be given:
CFG-FullRecovery Game:
1. The challenger provides a program CFG G = (V,E)
2. The adversary chooses a set N ⊆ V
The adversary wins the game if the nodes in N are the active ones.
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Init node
Node A
Node B
Node D Node C
⊗
⊗
f(x)
x ← 0
a ← rand()
t ← t + x × a
x′ ← t/a mod 2
(r, m)A
(r, m)B
(r, m)C
next path
next path
Fig. 7: Diagram of hiding process for nodes and routes
To get a grasp on how hard this game is, assume that we choose N at random
in V , where there are exactly |N | active nodes:
Pr [N is exactly the active nodes | N ⊆R V ] =
1
(|V |
|N |
) =
|N |!(|V | − |N |)!
|V |!
.
If one node out of two is active, and there are more than 42× 2 nodes in V , this
probability is negligible. Thus we may hope, for realistically large programs, to
resist adversaries for which there is no better way to choose N than selecting a
random subset of V .
However, in practice, adversaries may succeed in recovering smaller portions
of the CFG. This corresponds to the following game:
CFG-OneRecovery Game:
1. The challenger provides a program CFG G = (V,E)
2. The adversary chooses a node n ∈ V
The adversary wins the game if n is active and n is not the first node of G (which
is always active).
The success probability if n is chosen at random is
Pr [n is active | n ∈R N ] =
|N |
|V |
where again N is the set of (actually) active nodes. In the balanced case, where
2|N | = |V | this probability is exactly one half. When that is the case, and V is
large enough, security in this second game implies security in the first game.
As discussed above, static analysis cannot in general determine the variables’
values in a given node (by Rice’s theorem [13]). Given that the difference between
active and passive nodes is only semantic, for a general program determining
whether a given node is active is undecidable.
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Hence, our obfuscation scheme should be secure against static analysis, for
large enough values of N and few enough active nodes.
4.1 Security Against Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is performed by running and monitoring the program. As
mentioned previously, the first node is always active. The second node can be
determined as follows: Execution continues until the next path variable is up-
dated. At that point, we know that there is an active node between the current
node B and the first node A.
The analyst then performs the following operation: For each node n between
A and B in the CFG, replace n by another operation, and run the program up
to B. There are at most |V | nodes to test. A node is active if, when modified,
the program’s state at B has changed.
As each test is required to continue running the program until B, which can
take up to |V | steps, it is then possible to determine the next active node in
O(|V |2). By running this procedure iteratively for all nodes, we reconstruct the
list of active nodes, i.e. the original CFG, in O(|V |3) operations.
5 Implementation
Given as input a program CFG, we construct a “target” CFG to which the
original program is mapped.
1. Graph generation. We generate a random graph with n edge and maximum
out-dregee two, using a variant of the Tarjan-Eswaran algorithm [5, 12].
2. Linearisation. This graph is linearised, so that it corresponds to a CFG.
For this purpose we use the scheme presented by Leroy for the CompCert
compiler [9]. We then select a random morphism pi between the initial graph
and the new graph that we are creating.
3. Transformation. We begin the transformation by identifying the active and
passive nodes, the edges for paths are then changed by neutralizing (passi-
vation) the instructions using: registers and stacks operations, transforming
the jumps and internal call, and defining the route to follow according to the
routing variable. Finally, we remove the signature of the new graph hiding
the routing variable and node’s status (active or passive) by randomizing
their values and adding the variables path and next path. To mask the vari-
able next path we XOR it with the node’s values.
The source code of this implementation is available from the authors upon
request.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents a control flow graph trans-compilation algorithm allowing
to transforms a program into a new functionally equivalent program. This al-
gorithm uses common instructions such as register and stack operations, and a
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random routing variable, such that the resulting CFG is entirely different from
the original one. We let as a future work the study of the obfuscation perfor-
mance regarding the time expended in the transformation process for different
code size and if the obfuscation can be improved if we apply on P the same
transformation more than once.
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